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 I.  Introduction 
 
The Great Recession clearly focused attention on the importance and international 
interconnectedness of global banks.  Individual banks experienced unprecedented balance sheet 
disruptions, and pursued various strategies for dealing with these shocks.  Those banks with 
networks of foreign affiliates had, as one potential margin of adjustment, a possibility of 
reallocating liquidity across the organization. We explore this pattern of activation of “internal 
capital markets” within global banks using detailed, and so far unexplored, confidential 
regulatory data on all U.S. banks with foreign branches and subsidiaries.  Using methodological 
advances along the lines of Khwaja and Mian (2008) and bank-specific shocks to parent bank 
balance sheets as in Acharya and Schnabl (2010), we show that reallocations of internal liquidity 
are not evenly spread across all foreign affiliates when a parent bank is hit with a funding shock. 
International transmission is, on some level, a bank-specific phenomenon influenced by its 
prioritization of operations in terms of a range of “core” and “periphery” considerations.   
Despite the potential importance of this form of international capital flows, there is very 
little direct evidence or analysis of how such internal capital market transfers work within 
banking organizations. The first direct evidence, provided in Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(forthcoming), used bank-specific data and demonstrated that these flows transmit policy-
induced liquidity changes across markets even during “normal” times. As a result, these banks 
exhibit behaviors that can impinge on the effectiveness of monetary policy, impairing the bank 
lending channel at home.  Related work, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), uses data aggregated 
over banks for a range of individual industrialized countries. During the Great Recession, bank 
balance sheet shocks were transmitted to emerging markets through a range of channels: cross 
border flows, lending by affiliates in the foreign markets in which they operate, and those 
unaffiliated banks in foreign markets that rely on interbank market funding channels.  
To some degree, such evidence provides fuel for concerns of many smaller countries that 
foreign banks might restrict participation in local markets during a crisis, draining funds that 
otherwise would be available for local businesses.  Larger countries also expressed concerns that 
their banks might go abroad and target the needs of affiliates in other markets, exasperating 
conditions at home. Indeed, during the Great Recession there was an initial surge in the outflows 
of funds from many foreign-owned bank branches in the United States to their affiliate 
organizations outside of U.S. borders. In part to avoid sharp contractions in U.S. and 2 
 
international business activity, various emergency lending facilities in the United States provided 
extensive dollar liquidity to foreign banking organizations, also serving to stabilize activity in the 
United States.
1  
There also were significant changes in the flows between U.S. owned banks and their 
affiliates abroad. In the very early stages of the crisis, the foreign affiliates of U.S. owned banks 
also became, in aggregate, net recipients of funds from their parents, as shown in Figure 1. After 
the Lehman failure and during the peak of the crisis, and again later in 2009, the foreign affiliates 
were conduits for inflows of funds back to their parent organizations in the United States. This 
directional inflow into the United States through internal capital markets for this same group of 
banks was reversed in 2010, when foreign affiliates relied much more extensively on borrowing 
from their banking organizations compared with what previously had been the case. It also is 
noteworthy that regional patterns of aggregate changes differed sharply from the aggregate story, 
and banks also differed from each other in their allocation patterns. 
None of the prior studies have explored the features of countries and banks that make the 
branches or subsidiaries more likely to be buffeted by or protected from changes induced by 
shocks to parent bank balance sheets. In this paper we econometrically conduct this type of 
assessment, thus getting into the “decision rule” governing the operations of global banks and 
their overall management of funding and investment strategies. Such analysis would significantly 
advance our understanding of international banking and more broadly of the channels of 
transmissions in a financially integrated world. It also provides important insights into the 
normative discussion on rules and regulations affecting global banking and international capital 
movements. We use bank-specific data from confidential regulatory reports filed by all U.S. 
global banks that allow the complete mapping, by bank, of cross-border investments and of local 
investment and funding, and the tracing of internal capital flows between parent banks and their 
affiliates across the globe. To our knowledge, this data has never been explored for research 
                                                 
1See blog discussion on this topic by Linda Goldberg and David Skeie “Why did US Branches of foreign banks 
borrow at the discount window during the crisis? http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/04/why-did-us-
branches-of-foreign-banks-borrow-at-the-discount-window-during-the-crisis.html  On the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), see Olivier Armantier, Sandy Krieger, and Jamie McAndrews. 2008. On the central bank dollar swap 
facilities, see Linda Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu. 2011. One factor in the need for funding in foreign 
markets during the crisis was the prior build-up of maturity and currency mismatches within and across currencies 
on the balance sheets of banks (BIS CGFS March 2010). 3 
 
purposes.
2 Given the bank-specific balance sheet shocks at the onset of the Great Recession and 
the claim that their impact is related to asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) exposure, we 
examine which features of parent banks and foreign affiliates were associated with greater 
adjustments in internal flows within the global banking organizations. We demonstrate that bank 
business models and country and institutional features play clear roles in international 
transmission and contagion through internal capital markets of banks. Some foreign markets are, 
for particular parent banks, “core investment markets” that remain as destinations for funding. 
Other foreign locations serve as “core funding markets” that would send even larger net flows to 
parent banks in times of parent balance sheet disturbances. In general, a range of policy and 
institutional “distance” measures also influence the magnitudes of these flows.  This channel is 
shown to be economically important to both the parent banks and the foreign markets in which 
their affiliates are located.  
This research directly relates to three rich literatures. First, the literature on international 
transmission and contagion during crisis events, as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Edwards 
(2002), concentrates on refining the concept of contagion, or, as in Forbes and Chinn (2004), 
addresses whether this arises through international trade linkages, exposure to common 
competitors in trade, reliance on the international interbank market, or through foreign direct 
investment. Using data on stock and bond market returns, this work found that from the late 
1990s bilateral bank lending between countries became a sometimes significant determinant of 
international linkages, although this channel was still dominated by direct trade linkages.
3 For 
the recent crisis, (Acharya and Schnabl 2010) show that the use of asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) conduits by banks led the crisis transmission around the globe. 
Second, we deepen an understanding of the role of banks in international transmission, 
building on insights from early studies by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) and van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2003). In line with some of these papers, theoretical work by Devereux and Yetman 
(2010) argues that the recent crisis differs from earlier contagion episodes in that transmission 
recently was through the balance sheet constraints on global banks.  De Haas and Lleyveld 
(2010), Popov and Udell (2010), Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2010), Cetorelli and Goldberg 
                                                 
2 Goldberg (2002) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2006) use this data to describe bank international exposures and 
related risks.     
3 A related literature addresses the sources of business cycle co-movement. Imbs (2004) finds stronger business 
cycle linkages between countries with larger financial ties.  Prasad et al. (2007) surveys an extensive literature that 
explores the role of global financial linkages in economic volatility. 4 
 
(2011) and Buch, Koch, and Kotter (2011) demonstrate that international retail and syndicated 
lending reflected stresses on parent banks during the global financial crisis.  
Third, we add to an evolving literature on internal capital markets. Conceptually, internal 
capital market flows are viewed as leading to a more efficient allocation of resources (see Stein 
(1997), Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), and Stein (2002)), or as a managerial tool to 
mediate agency frictions within a firm, across separate divisions, (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)).
4 Cetorelli and Goldberg (forthcoming) provided 
the first direct evidence in the context of banks and monetary policy transmission across 
countries. That work complements other studies that provided indirect tests of internal capital 
markets in domestic or global banking organizations, such as de Haas and Lleyveld (2010), 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011).
5  
   Overall, the present paper provides direct evidence of patterns of liquidity management in 
global banking organizations. In particular, we present an econometric evaluation of the features 
of parent banks and overseas affiliates that influence the allocation of organizational liquidity. 
The results, that there are features that define “core” and “periphery” business functions, are 
clearly important for understanding potentials for international contagion through banks. We 
conclude that the insights are valuable for properly constructing liquidity and lender-of-last-
resort responses by official agencies in the event of market disruption.  
 
II.  U.S. banks and their foreign affiliates 
Banks can engage in international activities in many ways.  Historically, banks from 
developed economies were involved in cross-border lending to sovereign borrowers, and later to 
private bank and non-bank counterparties. Over time, a broader array of financial services also 
was offered to overseas clientele. In some cases, the parent bank would set up a branch office in a 
                                                 
4 Another relevant literature argues that countries that are more remote suffer from more international financial 
volatility, as in Rose and Spiegel (2009). 
5 That banks – as other business organizations – have active internal capital markets is not new, and evidence has 
been reported, among others and large for banks in the United States, in Houston, James and Marcus (1997), 
Campello (2002), Ashcraft (2006, 2008), and Ashcraft and Campello (2007). Recent contributions are by Schnabl 
2009 and Khwaja and Mian 2008.  This focus on internal capital markets of global banks is complementary to 
analysis of the entry decisions of foreign banks into specific destination markets (Claessens and van Horen 2008; 
Cerutti, Dell'Ariccia, and Martinez Peria 2007; Buch 2005). Much of that literature considers linkages between 
industrialized with emerging markets with most emphasis on lending activity. Our treatment subsumes these 
markets, but also considers the results of entry into markets where affiliates may draw funding, such as is the case in 
many industrialized countries. 5 
 
particular location in order to better serve those markets and interact with customers. 
Alternatively, banks could set up foreign subsidiaries, which are separate legal entities. Many 
factors influence this choice, including taxes, regulatory restrictions on entry and branching, 
preferences for retail operations, and economic and political risks.
6  Substantively, this choice has 
implications for the location of banking regulation, with home country supervisors having 
primary responsibility for bank branches and host country supervisors having responsibility for 
subsidiaries. The choice also matters for the degree to which liquidity can flow unimpeded within 
the banking organization. To a first approximation, intra-bank transactions are restricted to a 
small share of the balance sheet for subsidiaries, but are closer to unrestricted between parent 
banks and their overseas branches.
7  
From the perspective of the United States, the total number of globally active banks has 
declined considerably over time, from nearly 200 in the late 1980s to closer to 75 in the early 
2000s.
8 This trend broadly reflected the widely documented pattern of industry consolidation that 
occurred over the same time period. These banks can be exclusively engaged in cross-border 
transactions, or could have a combination of activities that includes having local affiliates in 
foreign markets. For our analysis, we begin with the full sample of internationally active United 
States banks, which are those institutions that file the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations 
Council (FFIEC) Country Exposure Report (FFIEC 009).
9  In this quarterly filing, each bank 
itemizes their claims, assets, and liabilities by foreign country. The FFIEC 009 report is strictly 
confidential and therefore micro details cannot be made public. However, with its information, by 
bank and by foreign country, on intra-organization borrowing and lending, it is precisely the type 
of data needed to further our understanding of liquidity management strategies of globally active 
banks. To the best of our knowledge this dataset has never been used before for such research 
purposes.  
                                                 
6 Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2007) provided econometric analysis of such choices for entry into Latin 
America and Eastern Europe.  From the vantage point of countries choosing an optimal structure of foreign entry in 
their own markets, Fiechter et al. (2011) argues that there is no one-size-fits-all conclusion. 
7 Within the United States, regulatory restrictions are provided in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 
8 Goldberg (2006) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2006) provide a broader description of this evolution over the last 20 
years. 
9 This report must be filed by every U.S. chartered, insured, commercial bank in the United States, including the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and US territories and possessions, or it’s holding company, provided that the 
bank (or holding company) has, on a fully consolidated bank basis, total outstanding claims on residents of foreign 
countries exceeding $30 million in aggregate. The reporters can be U.S. owned banks or foreign bank subsidiaries in 
the United States. 
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Since our analytical focus is on liquidity management across the global internal capital 
markets and their role in international transmission of shocks, we apply screens to the full dataset 
to restrict the sample of banks to those that actually have foreign affiliates. Our screens for this 
purpose are, by bank and by foreign location, for the existence of either positive “local liabilities” 
in foreign countries or affiliate support by the parent.
10 Starting with 2006Q1 and continuing 
through 2010Q1, this set of screens reduces the number of banks in our sample to more than 50 
over the full interval, although closer to 42 at any single date (Table 1).  As the table shows, this 
group of banks is split between U.S.-owned and those with foreign parent organizations.  
Given this unique data source, we are able to consider the details of this global presence 
by banks. The data show that many of these banks maintain overseas affiliate(s) in offshore 
financial centers.
11 Also, many foreign-owned banks have an affiliate in their parent country. In 
every quarter, at least 30 banks have affiliates in at least two foreign countries.
12 Across all 
banks, the foreign affiliates are broadly dispersed around the globe and span a total of 121 
countries.  
Visualizations of the geographic distribution of the foreign affiliates of U.S. banks
13 are 
provided in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 2 shows counts of how many U.S. banks had affiliates in 
any foreign country at 2007Q2 (the raw data is in Appendix Table 1).  Figure 3 shows the 
relative dollar value of total U.S. bank positions in these countries, with the value capturing the 
sum of the total of local liabilities (in both local and foreign currency) and net inflows from the 
parent organization (without adjustment if there are net outflows).
14 A large number of U.S. 
banks have affiliates in Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, in 
addition to the Cayman Islands.  However, a large number of countries, fully half of the sample, 
                                                 
10 The existence of local lending in a country is a sufficient condition for a foreign affiliate, but is not used as a 
screen since not all affiliate offices engage in lending activity. We include the country-affiliate pair if local 
liabilities, such as derived from accepting local deposits, or net due flows are observed in any of the observations 
periods of all sample. 
11 According to the International Monetary Fund, there are 46 countries that meet the definition of offshore financial 
center.  See Zerome (2007) for a discussion of alternative approaches to identifying OFCs. 
12 Note:  for the purpose of this table and the econometric analysis which follows, we exclude the large institutions 
that became banks or had a change in entity status late in 2008Q4 and in 2009Q1/Q2. Examples of such excluded 
banks are Goldman, Morgan, GMAC, CIT, and American Express. 
13 By “U.S. banks” we are referring to all legal entities in the United States as indicated in Table 1, regardless of 
whether these are U.S. owned or foreign owned. 
14 We do not address the issue of determinants of bank entry in specific foreign markets.  As shown by Claessens 
and Van Horen (2008), foreign entry tends to be associated with common language, similar legal systems and 
banking regulations, and geographic proximity.  These are measures of physical and institutional distance that are 
sometimes related to information costs. 7 
 
have affiliates of only two or three U.S. banks operating in the local markets. There is a wide 
variance in the total value of the U.S. bank liabilities across all of these countries.  The median 
country in our sample had about $5 billion in U.S. bank liabilities, while the largest countries had 
over $100 billion, and liabilities in the United Kingdom were even an order of magnitude larger. 
  What are some of the characteristics of these global banks? Drawing on a broader set of 
regulatory reports filed by individual banks or bank holding companies, e.g. the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) 031 “Call Report” and the Y9-C,
15 we 
collect parent bank information, including information pertaining to their size (total assets), 
solvency and liquidity, and foreign lending. Foreign lending is conducted through cross-border 
flows and through local claims, which are extended by a bank’s affiliated offices outside its 
borders. The upper panel of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the U.S. banks, with the 
average 2006Q1-2007Q2 data taken as a pre-crisis reference point, and comparable statistics for 
2009Q2 and 2010Q2 to reflect post-crisis evolution. 
The median global bank starts out as moderately sized, at over $50 billion in assets. 
However, the size distribution is very broad across all banks. The mean asset size is about $200 
billion, reflecting the presence of some very large banks in the sample. Across all the banks, 
liquid asset shares are typically under 3 percent of total assets, although some banks had liquidity 
over 5 percent prior to the onset of the Great Recession.  Bank equity or solvency ratios were 
generally close to 9 to 10 percent of bank total assets. For the banks in our sample, foreign 
“external” lending typically ranges from 2.5 to 5 percent of total bank assets. International intra-
bank flows are captured by reporting of “total net due from,” which is total internal lending (if 
positive) or borrowing (if negative) of the bank with its full spectrum of their foreign affiliates. A 
gross metric
16 indicates that the pre-crisis internal capital market balances were typically in the 
range of 2 to 8 percent of assets.   Some parent banks were net lenders to their foreign affiliates, 
while others were net borrowers. 
                                                 
15 Through the FFIEC 031 report, we used the following variables: total assets (RCFD2170), total loans 
(RCFD2122), total foreign loans (RCFN2122), equity (RCFD3210), and liquid assets constructed as the sum of 
securities, trading assets, and  (RCFD1754+RCFD3545+RCFD1350).  From the FFIEC 009, we have for the bank 
(or holding company), on a fully consolidated bank basis, the following variables: total cross border claims 
constructed as the sum of cross border claims by banks, public, and other (C915+C916+C917), total foreign office 
claims on local residents in non-local and local currency constructed as the sum of foreign office claims by banks, 
public, and other, and foreign office claims in local currency (C918+C919+C920+C922), net due to (or due from) 
own related offices in other countries (8595), and foreign office liabilities constructed as the sum of foreign office 
liabilities in non-local currency and in local currency (C938+C939). 
16 The absolute value of net due in relation to total bank assets. 8 
 
An even starker illustration of the absolute scale of internal capital flows of these banks is 
provide in Figure 3, which shows gross intra-bank flows
17 on the same axes as gross interbank 
flows.  These flows are of a similar order of magnitude.  Similar observation on scale can be 
made on the basis of Treasury International Capital System data, which show that over half of 
total U.S. bank claims and liabilities internationally are vis-à-vis their own affiliates.
18 
As the crisis progressed and then abated, some of the balance sheet characteristics of 
these banks evolved substantially. The contraction in the foreign loan share is noteworthy, an 
observation consistent with a more inward focus on lending.
19 Also, the use of internal capital 
markets by banks changed.  Some banks reduced reliance on this channel, while others expanded 
intra-bank flows. Figure 4 shows the totals across banks on net related borrowing over the full 
time frame of the crisis. 
The lower panel of Table 2 provides details for the foreign affiliates of the U.S. reporting 
banks, with each “affiliate” observation really an amalgam of all affiliates of a given bank within 
a given foreign country.  The information presented emphasizes dimensions along which each 
affiliate market might be assessed as “core” or “periphery” from the vantage point of the parent 
organization. Two types of information are highlighted: the financing of the affiliates, and their 
relative importance in the total foreign lending of the parent.  These respectively are viewed as 
indicative of the degree to which a specific affiliate market, from the vantage point of a parent 
bank, is a core or periphery location from the vantage point of sourcing “funding” or directing 
resources for “investment” or lending activity.
20 In terms of funding, we are interested in whether 
local deposits from a particular affiliate are large relative to the range of deposits accepted 
internationally. For investment strategy, we examine alternative variables include lending defined 
as a) that exclusively done by the affiliates, b)  the sum of cross border and local lending to a 
particular foreign market, or c) the long maturity share for a particular economy. We posit that the 
                                                 
17 Absolute values of net due to and net due from US banks with all affiliates as reported in FFIEC009 
18 Thanks to Gian Maria Milesi Ferretti for the relevant computations based on TIC bank claims and liabilities.  
These data are not exactly comparable to our underlying data. The bank flows that are captured are vis-à-vis all 
affiliates, not purely bank affiliates in foreign markets.  
19 Rose and Wieladek (2011) argue that inward reorientation by British banks amounted to financial protectionism. 
20The data used for this analysis is collected by bank and by affiliate country, capturing, for each country in which 
the reporter has an office or offices, the net liabilities (or claims) of that office or those offices on all other offices of 
the respondent that are located in other countries.  If the offices in a given country taken together have a net “due to” 
position with all related offices in all other countries combined, a positive figure should be reported and indicates 
that the affiliate is borrowing from the rest of the banking organization; a net “due from” position should be 
indicated by a negative sign and indicates that the affiliate is lending to the rest of the banking organization. 
http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC009_201103_i.pdf  Schedule 1.a memorandum item reporting. 9 
 
larger the affiliate share in the total funding and lending activity of a given bank, the greater the 
chance that this is a protected or core affiliate. The commitment may be even more secure if a 
larger share of loans is of longer maturity. Finally, we allow for the possibility that significant 
differences in claims flows may arise when claims are measured on an immediate counterparty 
basis versus adjusted for outward risk in the event there is an external guarantor of some claims.   
The lower panel of Table 2 shows that there are approximately 550 bank-affiliate market 
observations at any point in our sample.
21 There is a bi-modal distribution of affiliates per bank. 
Some banks have affiliates only in one or two foreign countries; many other U.S. global banks 
have affiliates in over twenty countries, with some in excess of 50 countries.  The funding models 
of banks also appear bi-modal. For some bank affiliates about 75 percent of financing is raised 
locally. In others, almost no local funding is collected. There also is a broad distribution of 
importance across affiliate markets to the overall international lending activity of each parent 
bank.  Indeed, one interesting observation is that about 40 percent of bank-affiliate locations had 
no local lending. Funds collected domestically apparently are used for other purposes or flow to 
counterparties outside of the local markets.  An interesting implication is that, while internal 
capital market flows may spillover to local market lending by some bank affiliates, this need not 
be the case.  Such observations provide a useful nuance to the literature on bank lending channel 
effects from internal capital market transfers.  The type of evidence we present here shows that 




III. Econometric Analysis of Transmission through Internal Capital Markets 
We now turn to the internal capital market flows across bank affiliates in response to the 
specific shocks hitting parent banks in the recent crisis. Our dependent variable will be the 
change in internal capital market borrowing (or lending) of an affiliate in a foreign location with 
                                                 
21 The units of observation are allocations across by-country affiliates by individual banks, instead of at the level of 
individual foreign branches or subsidiaries which we do not directly observe. 
22 Looking at a range of home countries and a range of host markets, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) provided 
indirect evidence that shocks to parent banks were transmitted to emerging markets through cross-border lending 
and that there was a smaller contraction in lending done directly by the affiliates.  Kamil and Rai (2010) confirm this 
pattern for Latin American countries, and also show that the local lending activities by the foreign banks – especially 
when heavily funded by local deposits instead of parent bank’s resources or wholesale markets – reduced the 
amount of contagion from the international liquidity squeeze. Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2010) 
provide cross-country evidence on the spreading of the crisis into macroeconomic and financial performance 
metrics, also finding that bank dependency on wholesale funding markets played a significant role in amplification. 10 
 
the rest of the parent banking organization.  The unit of observation is dimensioned by bank, 
country, and time. The econometric methodology recognizes that these flows could be influenced 
by features of countries in which affiliates are established, features of parent banks, and features 
that are specific to affiliate locations by bank.  
Among country characteristics, we consider the importance of distance from the U.S. 
parent – in geography, institutions and policy, the degree of capital account openness of each 
location, the prevalent exchange rate regime, and affiliate market status as an offshore financial 
center.
23 Among parent bank characteristics, we focus on size, solvency, liquidity, and 
investment diversification among foreign locations. Our initial OLS specifications include the 
country and bank-level characteristics, thereby adding a first extra dimension of insights to the 
international transmission literature. 
Yet, establishing the causes of transfers, whether due to a shock to the parent bank’s 
balance sheet or a shock to the foreign market in which the affiliate resides, requires separating 
potential contamination of each by concomitant changes in the other. This identification issue is 
long recognized in the literature on international contagion as difficult to address, as summarized 
by Rose and Spiegel (2010) and earlier addressed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).  
The multiple dimensionality of the dataset allows us to raise the bar in handling this 
problem. We adopt a difference-in-difference identification strategy similar to that employed in 
Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011). This approach relies on two points: 
1) the initial liquidity shock is not felt homogeneously across the individual parent banks that 
have foreign affiliates, and 2) more than one parent bank has affiliates in a particular foreign 
location. On the first point, and following Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009), Acharya and 
Schnabl (2010) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010), we posit that the initial shock that hit banks 
in the United States was proportional to their ex ante reliance on ABCP conduits.  Later, we 
assume that some of this balance sheet pressure was reversed by the range of liquidity facilities 
introduced after the Lehman bankruptcy. On the second point, we obtain identification by 
observing the differential response by the affiliates of separate parent banks in a given country, 
thus allowing us to control for common factors affecting market conditions in a particular foreign 
                                                 
23 While the legal form of the affiliate -- as a branch or a subsidiary-- could matter for effective activation of the 
internal capital market channel, data do not identify the mix of branches or subsidiaries in any affiliate location.  
Moreover, the decision on branch or subsidiary form is likely determined by similar sets of country characteristics 
included as controls in our regressions. 11 
 
location. By applying this difference-in-difference approach we isolate the role of bank-specific 
business models versus affiliate market effects in international transmission through internal 
capital markets. We provide a range of OLS results and also conduct fixed effects specifications, 
along with robustness checks. 
We use this approach to explore our two key conjectures that transmission through 
internal capital markets depends on how each bank classifies each affiliate location as “core” 
versus “periphery” according to: 1) affiliate funding strategies and, 2) importance as an 
“investment” market in the parent bank’s “portfolio”. On the first point, regarding finding 
strategies, (parent) banks differ from one another in their reliance on local liabilities to fund local 
investments. Moreover, each bank individually follows heterogeneous strategies in local funding 
reliance across their own foreign affiliate locations.
24 The econometric analysis exploits both 
these inter- and intra-bank heterogeneities in funding strategies, and we conjecture that in the 
event of a shock to the parent, internal funds are more likely to be drawn from affiliate locations 
that are more reliant on local funding pools.  On the second point, we exploit the fact that banks 
differ in their global investment strategies as reflected by the amounts of lending extended in 
each foreign location. Heterogeneity across banks along this second dimension captures, among 
other things, differential strategies of business expansion and market penetration. Heterogeneity 
within banks instead captures the relative importance for each bank of its investments in a 
particular market. We conjecture that, in response to a shock to the parent, funds are drawn more 
intensely from “distant” or “periphery” investment locations – those representing a smaller share 
of total foreign claims - than from “core” locations.  
Overall, by focusing on these two specific dimensions of global banks’ business model, 
we go beyond the observation of internal capital markets in aggregate, between parent and its 
foreign affiliates as a whole, and we are able instead to track the direction and the intensity of 
internal borrowing and lending in and out of each global bank’s own entire set of foreign 
locations. Thus, we provide direct evidence on a specific channel of international transmission 
by banks, nuanced by the international expansion and funding strategies of those same banks. 
Through this evidence we add to the understanding of contagion and transmission that have been 
explored in more “macroeconomic” studies.   
                                                 
24 In the context of this paper, local always refers to the location of the foreign affiliates of a U.S. parent bank. 
Hence, local is synonym with foreign country. 12 
 
 
III.1 The econometric methodology 
The basic supply schedule for bank i internal lending with its’ affiliates in country j at 
time t,  ij L , is expressed in terms of (log) changes from before to after the shock as 
 01 1 ij i j ij LD        
   is a constant term, Δ   is the indicator of the funding shock sustained by parent bank i, and    
is an unobservable term capturing simultaneous market shocks to affiliates of all banks in located 
in country j. The term ∆    captures the change in internal lending from before to after the event, 
and banks that were hit more by an adverse liquidity shock should be those that rely more on 
changes in internal lending with affiliates.  
In this particular estimating framework, as shown by Khwaja and Mian (2008), basic 
OLS could generate biased estimates of the internal capital market supply effect    
  if there is a 
correlation of supply with any simultaneous liquidity demand shocks embedded in the 
unobservable term   . Country fixed effects on model specification (1) can absorb any liquidity 
demand driven contamination thus resolving the bias problem affecting the OLS estimation. The 
resulting model specification is 
 1 2 ij i j j ij LD F E      
with    now unbiased and    being a vector of country fixed effect coefficients. In essence, this 
alternative model specification achieves identification by comparing the impact on internal 
lending of separate banks i to their own affiliates in the same country j. Any common shock to 
funding demand factors in country j would be absorbed by its own country indicator variable, 
thus leaving the coefficient   as an unbiased estimator of changes affecting the net supply of 
funding of each parent.  
This basic methodology can be refined in a number of directions. As said earlier, our 
dataset allows us to push further the identification strategy, having for the first time an in-depth 
look at from where exactly global banks may be may be drawing funds and to which location 
they may be directing funds in times of positive or negative shocks. As noted, we are particularly 
interested in testing whether these flows are related to the importance of local funding pools and 13 
 
“investment” locations, with potential different consequences for respective core and periphery 
locations for each global bank.     
While the fixed effects specification improves on OLS by facilitating identification of 
internal capital supply versus demand, it may be that both country and parent bank 
characteristics can be important determinants of specific internal funding dynamics. We expand 
on the basic methodology by allowing the parameter  1   to incorporate i and j features that may 
contribute to international transmission. Hence, we conduct the empirical exercise using the 
broader model specification 
  01 3 i ij i j ij LD         
where  1   to broadly defined as 
 10 4,    ii j j i ji j XXX        
and vectors of characteristics of parent banks ( i X ), affiliate countries ( j X ), and affiliate bank 
pairs ( ij X ) can be introduced.  
 
III.2. Identifying the funding shock timing and incidence 
As it has been widely described, the initial stage of the financial crisis materialized in the 
second half of 2007 in the form of a broad shortage of U.S. dollar funding. Banks and other 
financial institutions, both in the U.S. and abroad, had been accumulating substantial dollar 
denominated assets, mainly long-term securities derived from real estate activity and had funded 
such positions mainly through short-term dollar liabilities. The asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) market had been a crucial component in such dollar funding activities.
25 Commercial 
paper had grown to be the largest instrument in total U.S. short-term funding, with the ABCP 
component representing the lion share. While ABCP is issued by entities (conduits) distinct from 
the financial institutions in our sample, those entities can operate with the direct backing of such 
institutions, through the existence of liquidity or credit enhancements. Large commercial banks, 
both U.S. and foreign (mainly European) were among the largest providers of such 
enhancements.  
                                                 
25 Details are provided in Acharya and Schnabl (2010), Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009), and Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl (2010). 14 
 
Many ABCP entities were unable to continue issuing new paper in the second half of 
2007, once investors became concerned about the overall quality of the assets backing 
commercial paper issuance. As argued in Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009), off-balance sheet 
commitments by banks resulted in their massive absorptions of the assets of the conduits they 
sponsored. Consequently, the ex-ante large off-balance sheet exposures to the ABCP market 
materialized as a severe funding shock on many banks’ balance sheet, and many of these banks 
experienced larger drops in stock prices in subsequent months.  We use their data as a measure of 
individual banks’ pre-crisis exposure to ABCP (January 2007).
26 This ex-ante indicator is used in 
our basic model specification to proxy the degree of parent bank balance sheet disruption i D  . 
We examine two “shock” dates. For the purpose of our analysis, we take the pre-crisis 
period as beginning in 2006Q1 and continuing to 2007Q2. Indeed, short-term dollar funding 
markets exhibited no sign of turmoil throughout the end of July and early August as shown in 
Figure 4. We then define the period 2007Q3 to 2007Q4 as a “first shock” period, as the dollar 
funding pressure resulting from the events described above became more acute. We conjecture 
that the global banks that had been more highly exposed in the ABCP market would face larger 
funding imbalances. These same banks would therefore have larger needs to activate internal 
borrowing and lending with their foreign affiliates. Thus, for each bank-affiliate observation we 
construct the initial  ij L   as the pre-crisis average borrowing of affiliates in each foreign location 
from the rest of the banking organization (over the 2006Q1-2007Q2 period) and the average over 
2007Q3 and 2007Q4. 
We end the first shock period at 2007Q4 to coincide with the subsequent Federal Reserve 
institution of the Term Auction Facility in late December 2007, which provided emergency 
funding to banking institutions. This intervention was unprecedented and large in size. Hence, 
we define the period 2008Q1 through 2008Q2 as a “second shock” period. We treat this policy 
intervention event as a positive liquidity shock on parent banks’ balance sheet. We then look for 
any subsequent change in behavior by the same sets of banks, as differentiated according to their 
                                                 
26 We thank Viral Acharya and Philipp Schnabl for sharing this data.  The conduit group comes from Moody’s 
Investor Service reports. Acharya and Schnabl match conduits to sponsoring organizations and then match the 
sponsor to the consolidated financial company.  We match these consolidated financial companies to the U.S filers 
of regulatory report FFIEC 009.  If there are U.S. filers without Moody’s rated conduits, we treat the ABCP value as 
zero.  For each filer, the conduit value is scaled relative to 2007Q2 bank equity. 15 
 
same pre-crisis ABCP exposure. The second  for estimation defines the “pre” period as 
2007Q3-2007Q4 and compares this interval with data averages over the first half of 2008.
27 
We purposefully end our empirical exercise before the events associated with the failure 
of Lehman in September 2008. First, our identification strategy relies upon banks’ pre-crisis 
exposure to the ABCP market. Observing behavior based on balance sheet characteristics more 
than twelve months apart would probably introduce noise that would be hard to control.  Second, 
the Lehman event effectively marks a separate stage of the crisis, both in magnitude and 
pervasive repercussions across the globe, that would probably require a separate study altogether. 
The earlier events clearly provide cleaner econometric opportunities to explore the liquidity 
management of global banks and their roles in international transmission, which are the central 
subjects of this study. 
 
III.3  Regression variables 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the change in the borrowing by the foreign 
affiliates of bank i in location j from the rest of the banking organization (change in “net due”) 
over the time periods indicated above. A positive value reflects either an increase in borrowing 
by those affiliates or a reduction in affiliate lending to the rest of the banking organization.  The 
bank-specific ex ante exposure to dollar funding shocks is assumed proportional to i Exposure , 
the bank’s ratio of ABCP to its equity in early 2007. 
There are a set of country specific and parent bank specific variables that enter the 
specifications. We expect that affiliates in countries more distant from the United States along a 
range of dimensions will tend to have a larger response of internal capital markets in the event of 
a shock to the parent organization. For this purpose, distance might reduce the commitment of 
                                                 
27 The facilities fall under the heading of liquidity facilities versus lending facilities. The more traditional provision 
of short-term liquidity to banks and other depository institutions occurred through the traditional discount window, 
the Term Auction Facility and through the bilateral currency swap agreements approved and in some cases later 
expanded with 14 foreign central banks. The Federal Reserve’s Section 12(3) Lending Families were introduced in 
two waves, First, in March 2008 the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF) were introduced.  In the Period from September through November 2009, the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Money 
Market Fund Liquidity Facility (MMIFF), and Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) were 
introduced. See “The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity:   
Function, Status, and Risk Management, Office of Inspector General (November 2010). 
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-proof_Nov16_10.pdf. 16 
 
the parent organization to a stable net supply of funds to the affiliate and leads to larger changes 
in net due flows. Our metrics for distance are: 
  Physical distance ( j Ldistnyc ). (Log) physical distance is the great circle distance of the 
affiliate country from New York City, from Rose and Spiegel (2009).
28   
  Institutional Distance ( j Polity ). Under the assumption that institutional comparisons with 
the United States provide a metric of effective distance, we use a scalar ratings variable 
that ranges from strongly democratic (+10) to strongly autocratic (-10).
29  
  Monetary policy distance ( j Exrate ). For monetary policy distance, we consider whether 
the country has a de facto exchange rate peg with the U.S. dollar.  If there is no peg to the 
dollar, the monetary policy distance is assumed larger. We start with the coarse metrics in 
Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011), in which a country with a de facto peg or 
crawling peg has a rating 1 or 2, plus we include whether the central currency of the peg 
as the U.S. dollar. For countries missing from that classification, we take observed recent 
exchange rate movements for comparable guidance.  j Exrate =1 if a de facto dollar peg or 
crawl, 0 otherwise. 
  Financial frictions ( j KAopen ). Bank internal capital market flows may be managed 
differently for countries with stricter capital controls in place. To capture the extent of 
this financial friction we use the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital control measure.
30 
  Offshore financial center status ( j OFC ). We use the International Monetary Fund 
definition of offshore financial centers which encompasses locations that primarily orient 
business toward non-residents, have favorable regulatory environments andlow or zero 
taxation schemes, are disproportion in size of financial sector and domestic financing 
needs, and primarily deals in non-local currencies and entrepot business (Zerome 2007, 
Table 1). 
 
                                                 
28 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/MIMIC2.pdf 
29 Produced by the Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project.  The data source and related discussion of 
construction are available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm  and 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf 
30 For some offshore financial centers with missing Chinn-Ito observations, and after discussions we Chinn and Ito, 
we assign high values of openness to these countries. 17 
 
Parent bank characteristics also can influence the use of internal capital markets in 
response to a balance sheet shock. Activation of this channel given an adverse shock can 
potentially be larger for parent banks that ex ante have weaker liquidity positions, lower 
solvency values, less focus on foreign markets in lending, more focus on using foreign affiliates 
as funding sources, and more geographically diversified foreign affiliates. All parent bank 
metrics are constructed using data as of 2007Q2, which we take as the end of the pre-crisis 
period.  These variables are defined as: 
  Size ( i Totalassets ). Total parent assets. 
  Solvency ( i Solv ). Constructed as the ratio of bank equity to total assets. 
  Parent bank liquidity ( i Liquidity ). Liquidity is measured as the sum of bank liquid assets 
relative to its total assets.  
  External diversification ( i Herf ). The parent bank’s diversification of foreign affiliates 
around the globe is constructed as a Herfindahl index over total liabilities of affiliates 
across all countries in which such liabilities exist.  
  Foreign owner ( i Fowner ). We distinguish between immediate owners from the United 
States or a foreign country using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if foreign. It 
would be expected that these are subsidiaries in the United States (branches are measured 
through alternative reporting) that have a primary focus on U.S. operations. 
 
Finally, we introduce the variables that capture heterogeneity intra-bank in addition to 
inter-bank. As bank-country specific measures, we construct: 
  ij Localfinance . This variable is the local liability share in total local funding, and is 
intended to capture affiliate reliance on local deposits and other funding sources. 
  ij Loanshare . This variable captures the importance of each particular affiliate market to 
the total foreign lending of a parent bank. It is constructed as the ratio of total claims of 
bank i in location j to total claims over all locations.  
In further refinements, we also construct two additional investment variables: 
  ij Shortmaturity . This variable captures the ratio of maturities of claims less than one year 
relative to total claims.  This is taken as one proxy for bank “commitment” to a market, 18 
 
with the possibility that mostly short maturity claims is indicative of a bank that is less 
invested in an affiliate market for the long haul. 
  ij Outrisk . Exploiting information contained in the regulatory data, we construct a variable 
capturing the fraction of total claims in a given location that are in fact guaranteed by 
entities in other foreign locations. For instance, a bank may finance a firm in a certain 
location, but this firm is a foreign subsidiary backed by the parent somewhere else, or it is 
a firm that is able to obtain a guarantee provided by a bank in another country. Either 
way, differentiating between claims in a given location that are truly local in nature as 
opposed to those that may be more “international”, may also give information regarding 
the bank’s own commitment to that local market. 
 
In all regression specifications, residuals are clustered by parent bank identity.  Some 
regressions contain various groupings of explanatory variables or fixed effects.  The relative 
importance of groups of variables are tested and interpreted.
31 
 
III.4 Estimation Results 
The econometric results are provided in Tables 3 through 10.  Before turning to these 
results, it is useful to briefly place our methodology in the context of the prior literature.  In 
general, studies of international transmission or country have a heavy emphasis on the country-
level features that inform the channels and magnitudes of spillovers.  Our approach includes 
some such variables  j X  but these had very little explanatory power when introduced as free-
standing determinants of changes in bank internal capital markets with affiliates. Building on the 
literature by adding groups of variables, we find there is some limited gain in explanatory power 
achieved when bank specific shocks are introduced in the OLS regressions and also interacted 
with the country variables.  There was no incremental gain in the explanatory power of the 
regression by just adding in characteristics of parent banks  i X .  Throughout, the most significant 
                                                 
31 If a latter period including a preponderance of government supports to individual banks were to be examined, 
other potential variables for inclusion could be the magnitude of the liquidity crunch and/or economic slowdown in 
each counterpart country and the amount of government support provided for the banking system during the crisis.  
 19 
 
power in the regressions arose from specifications that also contain the affiliate bank features 
ij X  that are the focus of our study (appendix Table 3). These bank variables are key for 
identifying the internal credit market supply consequences of a shock to parent banks.
32 
Tables 3 through 6 contain specifications associated with Shock1, in which the allocation 
of borrowing of bank affiliates in the pre-crisis period is compared with borrowing in the second 
half of 2007.  The first two tables (3 and 4) contain the full cohort of reporting banks, regardless 
of whether these banks are U.S. owned or foreign owned.  The next two tables (5 and 6) instead 
include only the U.S. owned reporting banks. Econometric results for the Shock2 period are 
provided in Tables 7 through 10, in which we compare the affiliate bank borrowing average 
quarterly patterns of the second half of 2007 with their average quarterly patterns in the first half 
of 2008.  Below, we discuss the interpretation of the first set of tables and respective columns 
and then summarize findings from the remaining tables. 
Beginning with Table 3 column (1), this most basic OLS regression specification 
considers whether the change in lending of banks affiliated with a parent with some degree of 
ABCP exposure was proportionate to that exposure after the dollar funding shock hit markets in 
the second half of 2007. The constant term is negative, suggesting that, on average, affiliates 
reduced net borrowing from the parent organization or increased net lending to the parent 
organization. The coefficient on Exposure suggests that this effect was smaller if banks had 
higher ex ante ABCP exposure.  Recognizing that the OLS results may be biased due to 
correlated shocks within affiliate markets, column (2) provides the ABCP exposure coefficient 
under a regression specification that includes country fixed effects.  The difference in this 
coefficient across specifications indicates that bias from the OLS specifications may be prevalent 
but is not large. We next consider whether the pattern of significance is instead better explained 
by introducing a range of variables capturing features of each bank in their respective affiliate 
markets. Columns (3) and (4) introduce the share of local liabilities in total liabilities by affiliate 
bank and the importance of that affiliate market in the total foreign lending of each parent bank. 
Column (4) provides the unbiased coefficients from specifications including affiliate market 
fixed effects.  Note that the sample size is smaller in the fixed effect regressions.  This occurs 
                                                 
32 It is also the case that our identification strategy is geared toward exploiting fully the multi-dimensionality of the 
dataset. While the more aggregate country- or bank-specific variables are also more exposed to the issues of  mis-
identification mentioned earlier, the dimensionality is possibly an important reason for their relatively small 
contribution to explaining the internal funding dynamics subject of our study. 20 
 
because the controls require us to drop any affiliate country in which there is only one U.S. 
parent bank in operation.    
The key results of this table are robust across specifications. In response to the initial 
funding shock that hit parent banks,  1) on average all affiliates of U.S. banks reduced borrowing 
from the parent organization or increased lending to the parent organization; 2)  the internal 
capital market response had differentiation across banks related to the size of the parent balance 
sheet shock; 3) more net outflows of funds came from those affiliates that relied more on locally 
raised liabilities (“core” funding markets); and 4) net outflows from affiliates were mitigated or 
even reversed for the affiliate markets that were larger in the overall foreign lending of U.S. 
global banks (“core” investment markets). The next table, Table 4, explores this net internal 
borrowing activity further, but now with the additional variables that permit the parent bank 
funding shock to interact with the country characteristics and the parent bank characteristics.  
The OLS specifications are provided in columns (1) to (3), and (5).  Column (4) includes country 
fixed effects.  Specification (5) introduces all of the same country and bank variables in levels, as 
well as interacting with the ABCP exposure term. The coefficients of the variables in levels (not 
interacted with Exposure) are not shown. These full specifications are presented in Appendix 
Table 4.  
First, we observe that the combination of country and bank interactions provide little 
overall additional explanatory power to the entire regression. The main additional and robust 
insight is that the net borrowing of the affiliates were more protected or declined by less when 
the parent banking organizations were larger. 
Tables 5 and 6 are results based on specifications excluding those U.S.-chartered banks 
that are subsidiaries of a foreign “higher holder” or parent.  This exclusion allows for the 
possibility that the foreign-owned banks are different in that they could have access to a broader 
group of affiliates and internal capital market transfers that are beyond the scope of U.S. 
regulatory reporting requirements. All else equal, we might expect stronger results on the U.S.-
owned reporters for which we can observe the entire network of foreign banking affiliates. Table 
5 shows a similar pattern of results to those in Table 3.  As before, the average change in net 
borrowing by affiliates was (statistically) unchanged in the aftermath of the shock and 
differences across affiliates were similarly driven by the characteristics of the banks within the 
respective locations where they operated. The more liquid, ex ante, was the parent bank balance 21 
 
sheet, the more supported was the borrowing of the affiliates after the initial dollar funding 
shock.  Table 6 also confirms the basic patterns observed in the previous tables. A comparison of 
the estimated coefficients seems to indicate slightly larger internal funding movements for the 
restricted set of U.S.-owned reporters.  
What is the economic significance of the differences arising from the local finance and 
loan share variables? For this calculation, we use the results of column 4, Table 5 as a baseline. 
Starting with the local finance coefficient, we calculated the additional change in internal 
borrowing/lending for a bank at the 75
th percentile of the ABCP exposure distribution (a high ex-
ante ABCP exposure bank), between a location at the 75
th percentile of the local finance 
distribution (a “core” local funding location for the banking organization) and a location at the 
25
th percentile (a “periphery” funding location). The average Net Due value prior to the crisis for 
banks of high ex-ante Exposure, in relatively important local funding pool locations, was -$1,094 
million. In other words, the average high local funding pool location for such banks would carry 
a net claim vis-à-vis the rest of the banking organization of about one billion dollars. Performing 
the above mentioned exercise, we calculate that the location at the 75
th percentile of local finance 
expands its claim position by an additional $ 345 million relative to the location at the 25
th 
percentile. Given the pre-crisis average position for such locations, relatively important local 
funding locations expanded their support to the rest of the organization by about 30 percent, a 
non-negligible contribution. 
Likewise, we calculate the differential change in internal capital market flows for 
locations at the 75
th percentile of the loan share distribution (a core investment location) relative 
to locations at the 25
th percentile (a “periphery” location). The average Net Due value for core 
locations in pre-crisis quarters was +$1,902 million, thus indicating that such locations would 
normally carry a net liability position vis-à-vis the rest of their organization. The computation 
indicates that during the first phase of the crisis, the core investment locations contribute about 
$168 million less to the internal funding reallocation toward the rest of the organization, or about 
9% of their pre-crisis position. Note that the positive sign for the loan share interaction may not 
imply an actual increase in internal borrowing for the core locations in response to the shock to 
the parent, but rather a contribution of lower degree by these locations to the overall support to 
the parent.  22 
 
The remaining tables consider the Shock2, which we interpret as a positive funding shock 
to parent banking organizations that followed the introduction of the Term Auction Facility.   
Indeed and consistent with this reversed direction of shock to parents, the response of net 
borrowing by affiliates was in the opposite direction than observed with Shock1. The pattern of 
effects on internal capital market reallocated was related to the very same bank and affiliate 
features: the initial “outflows” from affiliates were reversed in response to the innovation in 
funding availability for the parent through the Federal Reserve facilities (Table 7). One 
difference across the two shocks and evident in Table 8 is that parent bank solvency features 
played a more prominent role in the second shock.  The higher the solvency of the parent, the 
more the affiliate continued to have access to net borrowing from the rest of the organization (or 
did not increase net lending to the rest of the organization). Additionally, this access was 
especially supported for parent banks with global lending operations that were more concentrated 
internationally (as indicated by the coefficients on the herfindahl index).  In the U.S.-owned only 
sample, the results continue to suggest slightly larger effects (Table 9) and that better parent bank 
liquidity and solvency helped internal capital market flows vis-a-vis the foreign affiliates (Table 
10).  
We gauged the economic magnitude of the local finance and loan share variables for the 
second shock using the results in column 4, Table 9 as a baseline. On local finance, we calculate 
that in response to the positive funding shock to the parent during the first half of 2008, the 
location at the 75
th percentile of local finance received about $654 million more funding than a 
location at the 25
th percentile (or it decreased its previous claim position by that amount). Given 
that the average Net Due value in the second half of 2007 for banks of high ex-ante exposure, in 
relatively important local funding pool locations, was -$2,534 million, this differential effect 
amounts to about 25% of its previous position. 
Similarly, in response to the second shock, core investment locations decreased their 
liability position by about $142 million more than periphery locations. Given the average 
position by such locations in the second half of 2007 was about +$4,731 million, the change 
corresponds to about 3% of their previous position. 
As a final note, we have performed various robustness checks to determine the sensitivity 
of these broad results to alternative measures of affiliate market importance in the parent bank’s 
investment portfolio across foreign markets (not reported).  Our results are robust to use of local 23 
 
claims, as opposed to local plus cross border claims, in the affiliate importance to the parent 
portfolio.  Our results also are robust to adjustments for just the long maturity component of 
these loan portfolios and to adjustments for claims in a given foreign locations but that are 
backed by entities in other countries (hence a more “international” lending pool). 
 
IV.  Concluding remarks 
In the very early stages of the crisis, on balance and in aggregate, the foreign affiliates 
became net recipients of funds from their U.S.-based parents, as shown in Figure 5. After the 
Lehman failure and during the peak of the crisis, and again later in 2009, the foreign affiliates 
were conduits for inflows of funds to their parent organizations in the United States. This 
directional inflow into the United States through internal capital markets was reversed in 2010, 
when foreign affiliates relied more extensively on borrowing from their banking organizations.   
Our empirical results shed light on the pattern of core and periphery affiliate markets that 
influence their relative roles in funding flows vis-à-vis the parents. This is important for 
understanding international shock transmission. Overall, given either a positive or a negative 
funding shock to the parent bank, funds are not reallocated to the same degree across all foreign 
affiliate markets. Among the core and periphery features of affiliate operations that we have 
identified are whether the affiliate operation relies on a local funding base and whether total 
cross-border and local lending to the affiliate market is substantial within the parent bank’s 
portfolio.  From the perspective of an overall affiliate market, macroeconomic transmission may 
be a function of the particular distribution of foreign banks engaged in their economy, the 
balance sheets of those foreign banks, and the ex ante features of the operations within the 
affiliate economy. Intra-bank funding flows can be a similar order of magnitude as the more 
frequently studies inter-bank funding markets, and we identify bank business models as 
important drivers of this intra-bank funding.   
These types of considerations and issues related to global liquidity management by 
banking institutions are at the forefront of policy discourse. The need for global banks to enhance 
internal practices for the management of liquidity risk is one of the pillars enunciated by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its renewed “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision” (BCBS, June 2008 and BCBS, December 2009). For instance: 
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 “Cross-entity funding channels are a mechanism through which liquidity pressures can 
spread through the group. An entity that provides regular funding to other entities of the 
group may be unable to continue providing this funding when it faces its own liquidity 
strain or when another entity is in need of extraordinary funding. For example, to mitigate 
the risk of contagion, a bank may establish internal limits on intragroup liquidity risk. A 
bank may also have limits at the subsidiary and branch level to restrict the reliance of 
related entities on funding from elsewhere in the bank. Internal limits also may be set for 
each currency used by a bank. The limits should be stricter where ready conversion 
between currencies is uncertain, particularly in stress situations.” (BCBS, December 
2009, p. 23).  
 
Increased emphasis on macro-prudential supervision and regulation can have direct 
repercussions on liquidity management practices by global banks and may lead to the 
introduction of possible guidelines and constraints to such practices.  Changes in such practices 
may have the effect of altering the transmission of liquidity shocks across markets in ways that 
are not well-understood. Our analysis points to key bank and country features that have 
influenced transmission to date, with those features including the extent of local funding of 
affiliates and the importance of that affiliate market to the business of the banking organization. 
The results thus point at a significant management of liquidity on a global scale by banks with 
global operations, and at important idiosyncrasies, based on individual banks’ choices in their 
global business model. These results have immediate normative implications, suggesting, for 
instance, that the patterns of international shock transmissions (through a global bank lending 
channel) would seem more the result of specific banks’ operations and less due to common 
country factors.  Of course, all of our results are drawn from a sample of banks that already have 
chosen to operate globally, and already have made decisions about the foreign markets in which 
they will operate. It is at that first stage of entry that the common country factors could be even 
more of a consideration. While our analysis does not speak to whether this global liquidity 
management potential that is being invoked has influenced the entry decision, presumably it has 
played some role.  If global regulation changes, an open question is how the location and scope 
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Table 1 Counts of U.S. banks that have foreign affiliates 
 
2006q1  2007q1 2008q1 2009q1  2010q1 
ALL banks 
Total 42 41 39 43 44 
US-owned 27 26 26 25 25 
foreign-owned 15 15 13 18 19 
 







Source: Quarterly Call Report forms, FR Y-9C, and FFIEC 009.  
Note: 
1Bank asset size is constructed from series RCFD2170 of the call reports and BHCK2170 of FRY-9C.  
2Solvency is the ratio of equity (RCFD3210, BHDM3210) to 
bank asset size. 
3Foreign loans are from series RCFN2122 of the call reports. (Note that no equivalents series are available for BHCs, which make up approximately 35% 
of the sample.) 
4Liquid assets are the sum of total held-to maturity securities (RCFD1754, BHCK1754), total trading asset (RCFD3545, BHCK3545), and federal funds 
sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (RCFD1350, BHCK1350).  
5Net due figures are from Column 4 of FFIEC009 Schedule1a.
  6Local liabilities 
figures are the sum of foreign-office liability in non-local currency and in local currency (Column 1 and 2 of FFIEC009 Schedule1a). Total liabilities are the sum of local 
liabilities plus net due inflows (positive values of Column 4 of FFIEC009 Schedule1a).
 7All claims reported in the table are on immediate counterparty basis. Local claims 
are the sum of foreign-office claims on local residents in non-local currency by sectors and in local currency (Columns 4, 5, 6, 8 of FFIEC009 Schedule1), and cross border 
claims are the sum of cross-border claims by sectors (Columns 1-3 of FFIEC009 Schedule1).
 8Long-term claims are computed as the difference of total local/cross-border 
claims and claims of remaining maturity up to and including 1 year (Column 7 of FFIEC009 Schedule1). 
9Outward risk transfer (Columns 9-11 of FFIEC009 Schedule1) 
shows all claims subject to risk transfers from immediate counterparty basis to ultimate risk basis.   
53.4 198.5 64.6 253.9 66.2 262.5
8.8 10.0 9.4 10.5 9.9 11.0
2.0 3.7 1.4 3.5 0.9 3.0
2.3 5.0 2.5 4.4 2.6 4.9
2.3 7.3 1.3 9.9 1.4 6.8
21 321 321 2
81.2 63.3 68.2 56.7 74.5 60.1
0.06 4.9 0.05 4.9 0.05 5.5
11.9 27.7 16.2 30.8 11.7 27.5
6.5 19.8 4.9 19.4 3.6 17.5
Table 2: Basic Balance Sheet Information of U.S. Banks with Foreign Affiliates
Number of parent banks or bank holding companies 44 43 44
    Local claims in country / Total local claims across all countries (%)
7
Number of  affiliates per parent bank
Affiliate Liabilities: 
Statistics computed by Bank, across Foreign Affiliates:
Compared across all bank-affiliate observations 
     Locally raised / Total within country (%)
6
Absolute value of Total Net Due / Assets (%)
5           





    Long-term total claims in country / All total claims in country (%)
8
Number of bank-affiliate country observations 566
    Outward risk transfer / All total claims in country (%)
9
mean
Bank asset size (billions USD)
1                                                          
Statistics on U.S. Banking Organization
Bank liquid assets / Total assets (%)
4                                                   
Bank solvency ratio (%)
2                                                                                          
Foreign loans / Assets (%)
3                                                                  
median mean median mean median32 
 
Table 3 
Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis - Shock1 
All U.S. Reporting Banks 
 
    
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  OLS Country  FEs OLS  Country  FEs 
       
Exposurei  168.2***  193.5***  -8.134  -23.52 
  (27.10)  (49.40)  (65.48)  (56.92) 
         
Expi*Local financeij      -400.6***  -465.1*** 
      (82.09)  (68.71) 
         
Expi*Loan shareij      8,955***  9,405*** 
      (1,282)  (1,308) 
       
Constant  -68.15*   -7.915   
  (34.34)  (45.16)   
       
Observations  546 512 546  512 
R-squared 0.014 0.159 0.174  0.298 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2007q3-q4 and 
2006q1-2007q2. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total 
equity. Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the 
ratio of total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 2 and 4 report 
fixed effect specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications 
we drop country records if there is only one bank in that country. In this table all U.S. reporting banks are included. Standard 
errors are clustered by banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 4 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis - Shock1 
All U.S. Reporting Banks, Country and Bank Controls 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Country and Bank 
controls
Country FE 
Country and Bank 
controls 
OLS 
Level controls  
included
Exposurei  -535.0  -406.2  -1,615  -1,392  -4,223* 
  (796.2)  (466.3)  (1,488)  (1,485)  (2,219) 
           
Expi*Local financeij  -313.6**  -849.2***  -890.3***  -811.6***  -908.4*** 
  (132.4)  (270.7)  (305.3)  (263.2)  (322.0) 
           
Expi*Loan shareij  8,865***  10,603***  10,863***  10,483***  10,866*** 
  (1,458)  (1,167)  (1,317)  (1,276)  (1,328) 
       
Country  variables       
       
Expi*OFCj  -92.80  20.27  59.38  88.08** 
  (115.4)  (66.98)  (55.32)  (42.75) 
       
Expi*kaopenj  -6.343   -0.0642  20.51  5.486 
  (33.51)  (38.80)  (42.17)  (20.21) 
       
Expi*ldistnycj  62.21  158.2  100.7  108.6 
  (90.07)  (127.7)  (115.3)  (94.25) 
       
Expi*exratej  80.73*   -80.40  34.24  -39.86 
 (42.31)    (131.1)  (157.8)  (134.4) 
Bank variables       
       
Expi*Total asseti    0.304** 0.457***  0.376*  0.0791 
   (0.128)  (0.160)  (0.203)  (0.296) 
       
Expi*Liquidityi    1,171 762.5 1,114  13,844 
   (1,379)  (1,576)  (2,464)  (8,342) 
       
Expi*Solvencyi    5,344 3,567 5,476  32,642* 
   (4,287)  (4,592)  (7,503)  (17,610) 
       
Expi* Herfindhali   -709.4  -680.4  -185.5  -391.7 
   (627.4)  (822.8)  (1,274)  (1,393) 
       
Constant  -6.103  -89.85*  -90.88  -381.6 
  (44.65) (53.33) (54.79)    (829.0) 
Observations  500 546 500 475 500 
R-squared  0.193 0.202 0.234 0.332 0.244 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2007q3-q4 and 
2006q1-2007q2. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total 
equity. Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the ratio of 
total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 4 reports fixed effect 
specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we drop 
country records if there is only one bank in that country. Column 5 reports results of a specification where all country and bank 
variables were included in levels (non interacted) as well, but the coefficients are not reported. Full set of results from such 
specifications are reported in Appendix Table 1. In this table all U.S. reporting banks are included. Standard errors are clustered by 
banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  34 
 
Table 5 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis - Shock1 
Only U.S. Owned Banks 
 
    
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  OLS Country  FEs OLS  Country  FEs 
       
Exposurei  184.8***  209.7***  -18.90  -35.91 
  (18.98)  (34.25)  (64.97)  (55.34) 
         
Expi*Local financeij      -425.4***  -520.3*** 
      (90.09)  (85.45) 
         
Expi*Loan shareij      9,918***  10,279*** 
      (578.6)  (515.2) 
       
Constant  -77.64*   5.187   
  (39.31)  (52.64)   
       
Observations  464 430 464  430 
R-squared 0.017 0.252 0.192  0.400 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2007q3-q4 and 
2006q1-2007q2. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total 
equity. Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the 
ratio of total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 2 and 4 report 
fixed effect specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications 
we drop country records if there is only one bank in that country. In this table regressions were run on the subset of U.S.-owned 
banks. Standard errors are clustered by banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.    
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Table 6 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis - Shock1 
Only U.S. Owned Banks, Country and Bank Controls 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Country and Bank 
controls
Country FE 





Exposurei  -599.8  -3,660  -5,603  -2,562  -7,307** 
  (1,037)  (3,807)  (4,445)  (2,902)  (3,291) 
           
Expi*Local financeij  -337.5**  -1,014***  -1,128**  -1,062**  -1,100** 
  (144.1)  (357.1)  (433.6)  (385.5)  (422.1) 
           
Expi*Loan shareij  9,857***  12,032***  12,540***  11,993***  12,454*** 
  (785.9)  (1,223)  (1,351)  (1,067)  (1,315) 
Country  variables       
       
Expi*OFCj  -100.5  6.630  91.49** 92.43** 
  (133.6)  (70.64)  (41.77)  (42.52) 
       
Expi*kaopenj  -6.983  14.86  21.90  4.144 
  (39.07)  (40.24)  (36.59)  (22.17) 
       
Expi*ldistnycj  68.26   255.8* 118.9** 139.0* 
  (117.6)  (147.5)  (44.20)  (76.66) 
       
Expi*exratej  95.47**   -112.6  39.43  -13.79 
 (37.09)    (159.9)  (188.8)  (132.4) 
Bank variables       
       
Expi*Total asseti    1.563 1.772 1.126  -0.0172 
   (1.289)  (1.308)  (1.031)  (1.394) 
       
Expi*Liquidityi    3,477* 2,942*  1,283  25,215* 
   (1,723)  (1,712)  (1,101)  (14,491) 
       
Expi*Solvencyi   -6,564  -10,061*  -6,972 37,974 
   (5,674)  (5,782)  (5,633)  (35,644) 
       
Expi* Herfindhali   24,071  24,135  11,467  10,227 
    (25,006) (24,804) (19,510) (22,422) 
       
Constant  7.221 -81.06 -78.43    -891.3 
  (51.30) (52.19) (52.01)    (1,199) 
Observations  423 464 423 398 423 
R-squared  0.215 0.234 0.277 0.451 0.291 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2007q3-q4 and 
2006q1-2007q2. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total 
equity. Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the 
ratio of total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 4 reports fixed 
effect specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we 
drop country records if there is only one bank in that country. Column 5 reports results of a specification where all country and 
bank variables were included in levels (non interacted) as well, but the coefficients are not reported. Full set of results from such 
specifications are reported in Appendix Table 1. In this table regressions were run on the subset of U.S.-owned banks. Standard 
errors are clustered by banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.    36 
 
Table 7 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis – Shock 2 
All U.S. Reporting Banks 
 
       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  Country FEs  OLS  Country FEs 
       
Exposurei  -14.09  8.306  -13.74  59.21 
  (26.66)  (40.63)  (46.77)  (40.44) 
         
Expi*Local financeij      780.0**  872.4*** 
      (289.5)  (247.3) 
         
Expi*Loan shareij      -6,333***  -7,912*** 
      (1,574)  (1,252) 
       
Constant  92.73**   14.07   
 (37.21)    (55.03)  
       
Observations 559  525  559  525 
R-squared 0.000 0.075 0.118  0.218 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2008q1-q2 and 
2007q3-q4. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total equity. 
Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the ratio of 
total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 2 and 4 report fixed 
effect specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we 
drop country records if there is only one bank in that country. In this table all U.S. reporting banks are included. Standard errors 
are clustered by banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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  Table 8  Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis – Shock 2 
All U.S. Reporting Bank, Country and Bank Controls 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Country and Bank 
controls
Country FE 




Exposurei  3,757***  -1,384***  2,895*  3,269*  4,827*** 
  (1,349)  (427.2)  (1,527)  (1,798)  (1,544) 
           
Expi*Local financeij  646.4*  1,122***  1,104***  1,072***  1,123*** 
  (356.0)  (194.3)  (278.4)  (273.0)  (275.2) 
           
Expi*Loan shareij  -6,275***  -7,096***  -7,279***  -8,283***  -7,310*** 
  (1,717)  (1,550)  (1,751)  (1,450)  (1,734) 
Country  variables       
       
Expi*OFCj  337.2  187.0  157.5  164.1 
  (291.8)  (231.7)  (249.7)  (208.8) 
       
Expi*kaopenj  -71.98  -85.16  -117.3  -94.13 
  (75.32)  (71.64)  (90.87)  (65.33) 
       
Expi*ldistnycj  -432.9***  -502.4***  -553.8***  -472.7*** 
  (146.4)  (168.6)  (174.3)  (143.7) 
       
Expi*exratej  -9.296  79.07  181.3  144.3 
 (232.6)    (171.3)  (213.9)  (144.1) 
Bank  variables       
       
Expi*Total asseti    -0.229** -0.287** -0.242**  -0.693*** 
   (0.103)  (0.109)  (0.118)  (0.110) 
       
Expi*Liquidityi    2,545*  2,483 2,945 -3,194 
   (1,397)  (1,546)  (2,128)  (3,054) 
       
Expi*Solvencyi    9,922*** 11,540*** 14,074**  -3,435 
   (3,048)  (3,639)  (5,331)  (5,532) 
       
Expi* Herfindhali    1,677*** 1,642***  1,003 -30.68 
   (577.0)  (598.7)  (778.7)  (929.2) 
       
Constant  0.456  73.33* 68.03*   120.9 
  (65.18) (38.83) (37.43)    (376.5) 
Observations  513 559 513 488 513 
R-squared  0.154 0.140 0.186 0.267 0.195 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2008q1-q2 and 
2007q3-q4. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total equity. 
Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the ratio of 
total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 4 reports fixed effect 
specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we drop 
country records if there is only one bank in that country. Column 5 reports results of a specification where all country and bank 
variables were included in levels (non interacted) as well, but the coefficients are not reported. Full set of results from such 
specifications are reported in Appendix Table 1. In this table all U.S. reporting banks are included. Standard errors are clustered 
by banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 9 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis – Shock 2 
Only U.S. Owned Banks 
 
       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  Country FEs  OLS  Country FEs 
       
Exposurei  -19.12  0.0694  0.826  76.33** 
  (27.65)  (38.57)  (42.27)  (35.98) 
         
Expi*Local financeij      832.0**  923.6*** 
      (311.3)  (284.5) 
         
Expi*Loan shareij      -7,188***  -8,681*** 
      (947.8)  (662.8) 
       
Constant  103.6**   1.379   
 (43.13)    (65.64)  
       
Observations 479  445  479  445 
R-squared 0.000 0.134 0.133  0.286 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2008q1-q2 and 
2007q3-q4. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total equity. 
Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the ratio of 
total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 2 and 4 report fixed 
effect specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we 
drop country records if there is only one bank in that country. In this table regressions were run on the subset of U.S.-owned 
banks. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 10 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis – Shock 2 
Only U.S. Owned Banks, Country and Bank Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Country and Bank 
controls
Country FE 




Exposurei  4,706***  -2,565*  1,508  -1,643  2,273 
  (1,132)  (1,486)  (1,850)  (2,104)  (1,572) 
           
Expi*Local financeij  713.9*  1,261***  1,307***  1,282***  1,310*** 
  (381.2)  (116.9)  (144.1)  (131.1)  (148.3) 
           
Expi*Loan shareij  -7,170***  -8,151***  -8,479***  -9,490***  -8,471*** 
  (1,077)  (816.1)  (863.5)  (520.4)  (884.1) 
Country  variables       
       
Expi*OFCj  406.2  225.1  72.19  135.9 
  (332.5)  (260.1)  (199.1)  (224.0) 
       
Expi*kaopenj  -96.68  -118.3  -120.5*  -108.1 
  (74.62)  (71.16)  (59.33)  (66.26) 
       
Expi*ldistnycj  -538.0***  -629.2***  -597.1***  -591.7*** 
  (122.4)  (164.8)  (101.7)  (149.1) 
       
Expi*exratej  -36.68  74.83  200.0  176.8 
 (246.4)    (161.9)  (225.4)  (125.4) 
Bank  variables       
       
Expi*Total asseti   -0.0193  0.138  0.661  -0.272 
   (0.305)  (0.250)  (0.494)  (0.308) 
       
Expi*Liquidityi   1,489  2,601** 6,030***  3,229 
   (1,197)  (961.9)  (1,850)  (2,983) 
       
Expi*Solvencyi    28,687*** 33,900*** 43,845*** 32,702*** 
   (4,602)  (3,642)  (6,080)  (7,465) 
       
Expi* Herfindhali   -405.0  4,061  12,629  -791.4 
   (4,939)  (3,917)  (8,607)  (4,879) 
       
Constant  -13.41 20.89 33.48    310.8 
  (74.54) (32.12) (30.10)    (578.5) 
Observations  438 479 438 413 438 
R-squared  0.180 0.169 0.230 0.353 0.233 
The dependent variable is the change in internal borrowing of foreign affiliates of bank i in country j between 2008q1-q2 and 
2007q3-q4. ABCP exposure is the ratio of total ABCP outstanding of conduits sponsored by each bank i divided by total equity. 
Local finance is the ratio of locally raised funds to total liabilities of affiliates of bank i in country j. Loan share is the ratio of 
total claims of bank i in country j divided by total claims of bank i aggregated over all countries. Column 4 reports fixed effect 
specifications. Country indicator variables are included but the coefficients are not reported. In the FE specifications we drop 
country records if there is only one bank in that country. Column 5 reports results of a specification where all country and bank 
variables were included in levels (non interacted) as well, but the coefficients are not reported. Full set of results from such 
specifications are reported in Appendix Table 1.  In this table regressions were run on the subset of U.S.-owned banks. *** 
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Intra-bank flows
Figure 3  Intra-bank and Interbank Flows of U.S. Banks 
Source: FFIEC 009 and BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics
Note:  Intra-bank flows are computed as the sum of net due  to (from) of affiliates (in absolute value), from FFIEC 009. Interbank 
flows are computed as the sum of foreign claims of the U.S. vis-a-vis rest of world and of rest of world vis-a-vis the U.S., from BIS.
Interbank flows43 
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Figure 5 Net Related Borrowing by Overseas Affiliates of U.S. Banks 
 
Source: Authors’ construction using FFIEC 009 data across U.S. reporting banks.   



































   Appendix Table 1  Countries (of 121) and Affiliates of U.S. Banks in Sample, By Country  
 
Affiliate country  Counts
(avg) 
Affiliate country   Counts 
(avg) 
Affiliate country   Counts 
(avg) 
Albania  1 Grenada  1 Palau  1
Algeria  1 Guatemala  2 Panama  8
Argentina  9 Haiti  1 Papua New Guinea  1
Australia  11 Honduras  2 Paraguay  2
Austria  4 Hong Kong  14 Peru  2
British West Indies  8 Hungary  4 Philippines  5
Bahamas  11 Iceland  1 Poland  6
Bahrain  4 India  8 Portugal  4
Bangladesh  2 Indonesia  4 Qatar  2
Barbados  5 Ireland  12 Romania  3
Belgium  8 Israel  4 Russia  4
Belize  1 Italy  9 Saudi Arabia  4
Bermuda  9 Ivory Coast  1 Senegal  1
Bolivia  1 Jamaica  2 Serbia And Montenegro  1
Bosnia And Herzegovina  1 Japan  11 Seychelles  1
Brazil  8 Jordan  2 Singapore  12
Brunei  1 Kazakhstan  2 Slovakia  2
Bulgaria  2 Kenya  1 South Africa  4
Cameroon  1 Korea  10 Spain  10
Canada  21 Kuwait  3 Sri Lanka  1
Cayman Islands  30 Latvia  1 Sweden  5
Channel Islands & Isle Of Man  8 Lebanon  3 Switzerland  7
Chile  7 Lithuania  1 Taiwan  10
China  11 Luxembourg  12 Tanzania  1
Colombia  5 Macau  2 Thailand  6
Congo, Democratic Rep.  1 Malaysia  5 Trinidad  2
Costa Rica  3 Malta  1 Trinidad And Tobago  3
Cyprus  2 Mauritania  1 Tunisia  1
Czech Republic  6 Mauritius  5 Turkey  5
Denmark  4 Mexico  10 Uganda  1
Dominican Republic  4 Monaco  2 Ukraine  2
Ecuador  2 Morocco  1 United Arab Emirates  6
Egypt  2 Namibia  1 United Kingdom  18
El Salvador  2 Nepal  1 Uruguay  8
Finland  4 Netherlands  11 Venezuela  4
France  1 Netherlands Antilles  5 Vietnam  2
French Guiana  8 New Zealand  5 Zambia  1
French West Indies   1 Nicaragua  2    
Gabon  1 Nigeria  1    
Germany  12 Norway  5    
Gibraltar  2 Oman  1    
Greece  4 Pakistan  3    46 
 






























United Kingdom  396.2 8.1 2.5 10  0  0
Japan  141.5 8.8 2.5 10  0  0
Canada  136.2 7.4 2.5 10  0  0
Germany  104.6 8.3 2.5 10  0  0
Mexico  89.8 7.6 1.1 8  0  0
Cayman Islands  83.5 7.8 2.5   1  1
Korea  78.9 8.8 -0.1 1  0  0
Netherlands  70.9 8.2 2.5 10  0  0
Australia  64.7 9.3 1.1 10  0  0
France  60.5 8.2 2.5 9  0  0
India  44.6 9.0 -1.1 9  0  1
Spain  39.8 8.2 2.5 10  0  0
Brazil  36.6 8.2 0.4 8  0  0
Italy  35.8 8.4 2.5 10  0  0
Singapore  35.4 9.2 2.5 -2  1  0
Ireland  34.1 8.0 2.5 10  1  0
Luxembourg  32.0 8.2 2.5   1  0
China  29.6 8.9 -1.1 -7  0  0
Hong Kong  25.6 9.0 2.5   1  1
Switzerland  23.8 8.3 2.5 10  0  0
 
1 Total claims is the sum local claims and cross border claims, from authors’ computations based on FFIEC 009 
reporting by quarter. 
2 Log physical distance is the great circle distance of the affiliate country from New York City, from Rose and 
Spiegel (2009). 
3 Index ranges in value from −1.8 in the case of full control to 2.5 in the case of complete liberalization, from 
Chinn and Ito (2008).  
4 Country ratings on a scale ranging from strongly democratic (+10) to strongly autocratic (-10), from Center for 
Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project. 
5 Variable takes the value 1 if affiliate country is an offshore financial center, 0 otherwise, from International 
Monetary Fund. 
6 Variable takes the value 1 if currency of affiliate country is de facto dollar peg or crawl, 0 otherwise, from 




Appendix Table 3 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis – Shock 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









































































































       




































































































       






















       




















Observations  500 500 500 500 500 
Adjusted R-squared  0.003 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.220 48 
 
Appendix Table 4 Net Internal Borrowing Dynamics During the Crisis 
Full specifications with level and interaction controls 










ABCP exposurei  -4,357*  -8,208**  5,370***  4,505** 
  (2,319)  (3,413)  (1,573)  (1,987) 
Expi*Local financeij  -690.8*** -790.2** 1,100*** 1,264*** 
  (253.2) (313.6) (307.0) (157.5) 
Expi*Loan shareij  10,744***  11,944***  -8,258***  -9,264*** 
  (1,154)  (992.7)  (1,429)  (720.5) 
Exposurei*OFCj  80.02** 66.25**  122.5 132.5 
  (35.54) (26.52) (200.9) (226.6) 
Exposurei*kaopenj  -2.408  -9.258  -83.82  -103.6 
  (23.10)  (27.77)  (62.43)  (64.73) 
Exposurei*ldistnycj 102.2 112.5  -507.0*** -616.0*** 
  (95.41) (71.38) (145.9) (157.9) 
Exposurei*exratej  -36.30  -2.147  126.2  129.2 
  (138.1)  (133.0)  (147.6)  (145.1) 
Exposurei*Total asseti  0.105 -0.390  -0.744*** -0.745* 
  (0.307) (1.392) (0.133) (0.431) 
Exposurei*Liquidityi  14,658  31,183**  -4,029  1,707 
  (8,767)  (14,654)  (3,082)  (2,631) 
Exposurei*Solvencyi  33,771*  56,784 -6,125 13,568 
  (18,940) (34,738)  (5,589)  (12,884) 
Exposurei* Herfindhali  -292.2  6,192  514.2  -1,250 
  (1,448)  (22,618)  (1,100)  (5,312) 
OFCj  -84.68 -79.24 82.34  147.6 
  (101.6) (114.6) (94.66) (113.8) 
kaopenj  -1.953  19.91  -2.348  -17.57 
  (50.63)  (71.14)  (30.68)  (42.22) 
ldistnycj  52.47 127.2 11.16 -8.939 
  (83.04) (117.2) (54.73) (80.67) 
exratej  -51.85  -127.5*  -56.30  -66.27 
  (65.32)  (68.49)  (95.51)  (118.1) 
Total asseti  -0.104 0.117  0.440*** 0.335* 
  (0.169) (0.234)  (0.0885)  (0.171) 
Liquidityi  -3,522  -7,395*  713.1  -532.6 
  (2,162)  (3,593)  (640.1)  (736.4) 
Solvencyi  -218.7 -2,098 982.0  1,581 
  (2,061) (2,579) (912.9) (1,943) 
Herfindhali  337.4  275.2  -83.05  -56.02 
  (295.6)  (212.6)  (235.4)  (348.4) 
Local financeij  -286.4* -419.0*  43.76 64.84 
  (154.8) (208.2) (161.2) (166.7) 
Loan shareij  -142.7  273.2  1,647**  1,929 
  (427.7)  (571.2)  (812.1)  (1,232) 
      
Constant  -324.1 -805.7 -387.9 -237.5 
  (822.2) (1,144) (496.1) (755.8) 
      
Observations  500 423 513 438 
R-squared  0.253 0.305 0.213 0.250 
 
 